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Abstract 
The men of the British section of the Palestine police have romantically imagined their time as 
officers in Mandate Palestine, a land infused with historical and biblical significance. Many 
compared their service to that of the famed military force, the French Foreign Legion. This 
study sets the nostalgia of memory against the reality of service in Palestine, one that 
involved considerable brutality against local people. This essay details the empirical evidence 
of violence, including torture and a ‘dirty war,’ mining archival sources, contextualising 
primary source material within wider notions of British ideas of collective punishment within 
the empire. The Palestine police failed in its job of policing, necessitating the deployment of 
the Army to Palestine, and with this collapse in police control the force became more violent. 
Ironically, the reality of life in the Palestine police was similar to that in the French Foreign 
Legion: a shock force there to maintain imperial control. The article argues that policing 
methods from the Mandate period continued after the Palestine force was disbanded in 1948, 
both within Israel and in other parts of the British Empire where demobilised Palestine police 
officers went to serve. It pushes the current paradigm on policing, extending the literature 
that details reforms and institutional change in the Palestine police to include the impact on 
local people. 
 
Key words: Foreign Legion, Palestine, police, torture, death squads, colonial State, 
collective punishment, racism, memory, Israel, dirty war 
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Introduction 
There has never been a British Foreign Legion.1 However, in their memoirs and oral 
histories, the men who joined the British Mandate Palestine police from the 1920s to 
the 1940s remembered themselves as precisely that: a ‘British Foreign Legion,’ (‘with 
the faults as well,’ added one police Sergeant, candidly).2 They romantically 
mythologized the force and the historic land in which they served. British 
Servicemen had had long experience of imperial service overseas but Palestine was 
not just another strange foreign posting. It was the ‘Holy Land’ of ‘milk and honey,’ 
inhabited by Arabs and Jews, and made wonderful by the stories of the Bible and the 
tales of the Thousand and One Nights.3 As one police officer described it, ‘the dark 
secrets and murders and every other crime peculiar to the east will I am afraid never 
be known.’4 The men discursively cultivated an image of a curious, exotic posting for 
raffish types after adventure. ‘The British Empire did not have a Foreign Legion, but 
it did have the Palestine police which shared something of the arduous way of life of 
that famed French Corps,’ was how Ted Horne, the force’s historian and a former 
Palestine policeman, put it many years later.5 James Tait was a grammar school boy 
who wanted to join the French Foreign Legion but lacked the funds to make the 
journey to Marseilles and so joined the Palestine police after seeing an advertisement 
in the Daily Telegraph.6 One Palestine policeman had been in the French Foreign 
Legion and opined that it was ‘cushy’ by comparison to service in Palestine; a 
‘Legion of the Lost’ was how another policeman described his time in Palestine in 
the 1920s.7 
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The public stories of the men who went to Palestine are those of soldiers in other 
armies, filled with adventure, masculinity and the cosh of tough drill sergeants, all 
willingly endured – what has been termed the ‘masculine ideal’ in the context of the 
US Marine Corps.8 ‘It was like being in a concentration camp, enjoyable, but you 
never stopped from dawn to dusk’ was Reuben Kitson’s recollection of the Palestine 
police recruits’ depot on Mount Scopus, one run on military lines and staffed by 
Guards drill staff.9 Filled with old soldiers’ tales of the Great War, men at a loose end 
in the bleak times of the Depression and who wanted ‘fresh air and adventure’ – ‘I 
was in a dead end job,’ remembered Geoffrey Morton – sought escape in a new, even 
tougher life.10  
 
Any nascent mythology of a British Foreign Legion in Palestine has long since 
evaporated. We do not remember these men as they saw themselves, as British 
legionnaires. But like the French Foreign Legion, the Palestine police attracted 
former soldiers, initially from the British paramilitary ‘Black and Tans’ force used 
against Irish rebels in the early 1920s, a force that established the basis for police 
forces across Britain’s colonies.11 Later on, regular demobilized soldiers went out to 
Palestine, right up to when the Palestine police was disbanded in 1948.12 Until 1930, 
the Crown Agents in London only recruited ex-Servicemen for the Palestine Police.13 
The Palestine police was paramilitary in style, equipped and trained on military 
lines, and it served alongside the Army. It also attracted men who were in some real 
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or imagined sense on the margins of society, like the recruits for the French Foreign 
Legion. Thus, in the 1930s, the Inspector-General of the police attempted to broaden 
and improve his force by recruiting men of ‘reasonable education’ who would help 
weed out the ‘unsuitable’ ones, ‘guilty’ of ‘misbehaviour.’14 This was a ‘crack force’ – 
the expression used in recruitment posters in the 1940s – by which was meant a 
tough, elite unit for men who would not shy away from the violence inherent in 
colonial control.15 Like the French Foreign Legion, the British police was militarized, 
tough, racist and there to enforce colonial pacification. (This is not to say that the 
French Foreign Legion was everything that its erstwhile British counterparts 
imagined it to be. For instance, Claire Denis’ 1999 film ‘Beau Travail’ explores the 
hyper-masculinity and homo-eroticism of the French force.) 
 
This paper counterpoises the internally generated romantic image of the Palestine 
police with the hard, violent reality of colonial policing. There are two histories of 
policing in Palestine, one visible, one hidden: that of ordinary British men having the 
adventure of their lives as police officers; the other, harder to find, expresses the 
quotidian, structural power of colonial rule. Colonial policing was not based on 
popular consent and British imperial rule had always required some level of real or 
threatened force; in Palestine, the official policy of support for Jewish immigration 
and settlement (up until 1939) sharpened and deepened the violent encounter 
between the forces of the State and local Arabs. After 1945, the security forces fought 
Jews in the country. The romance of contemporary recruitment for colonial policing 
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and the nostalgia of men’s memories jar with the contemporary data on the violence 
of the colonial project, as this essay will now show. 
 
Euphemisms: ‘black and tan methods,’ the ‘third degree,’ ‘Turkish ways’ 
The men who first went to Palestine in the early 1920s were acclimatized to violence. 
They were war veterans twice over, most having served in the First World War and 
then in Ireland in the ‘Black and Tans’ and Auxiliary forces during the rebellion 
there, and they easily transferred the violence of Ireland to Palestine. When Ireland 
became a Dominion in 1921 ‘a steady stream’ of former police officers from the Royal 
Irish Constabulary, men who had served alongside the ‘Black and Tans,’ went to 
India and the colonies, including Palestine.16 Service in Ireland had been hard, 
Servicemen hating the population that they supposedly served, attracting only 
hatred in return, ‘and thus began a vicious cycle of violence to which there seemed 
no logical end.’17 The men were ‘ruthless,’ ‘arrogant’ and, like the soldiers of the 
French Foreign Legion, they drank heavily.18 This continued in Palestine, men 
‘drinking deeply,’ so deeply that on one occasion off-duty police officers were lucky 
to escape a grenade attack on the bar in which they were drinking – a more sober 
soldier with them having the foresight to hurl the device back out in to the road – 
after which police officers ‘thrashed’ every Arab they saw. ‘The last thing I 
remember is unhitching a cart horse and racing someone on a donkey down the 
main street,’ recalled a policeman at the scene.19 
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‘Black and tan methods’ was the neologism used to describe the brutality of the 
police force in Palestine; the ‘third degree’ or ‘gentle persuasion’ were other 
euphemisms for a system that hid violence behind the fig leaf of language.20 British 
clergy in Palestine wrote of how they were ‘seriously troubled at the “Black and 
Tan” methods of the police,’ adding that they could do little to stop what was 
happening.21 Soldiers and police ‘turned the blind eye,’ ‘bumping off’ suspects who 
were ‘shot trying to escape’ – all of which ‘saved a lot of trouble.’22 Gasps and 
mumbles can be heard during the last comment in a later oral history recording by 
police office Geoffrey Morton – a combination one suspects of bad memories and old 
age. 
 
 
The machismo of the police was comical, such as when policeman Sydney Burr 
received a handkerchief from home, after which he was forced to write back (rather 
absurdly), 
 
I am afraid I will not be able to use it here, the old Black and Tans who were 
the beginning of this force do not look upon such effeminate apparel in a 
kindly light. They think the force is going to the dogs as it is. It is because of 
the soft ways that are creeping into the police that the Arabs are so defiant.23 
 
7 
 
The police were more violent than British soldiers, Army commanders having to 
issue ‘stringent orders against harshness and unnecessary violence’ to prevent police 
brutality spreading to the troops.24 When Palestinian fighter Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah 
recounted to this author his memories of being tortured by the police – a story 
inflected by a different narrative, that of Palestinian nationalism – he singled out the 
police and not the Army as using pre-meditated brutality.25 The Army was less bad, 
simply wrecking villages and shooting people. Soldiers had better discipline, lived 
away from local people and only served temporarily in the country during times of 
trouble when the police could not cope. The Royal Ulster Rifles, a hard-charging 
regiment that knew all about punitive operations (‘they weren’t shy of doing some 
violence,’ including at the Arab village of al-Bassa), wrote to the High Commissioner 
complaining about the brutality of the police.26 
 
The Palestine police worked under Ottoman law – largely Napoleonic in content – 
which the Mandate authorities gradually replaced with UK Statute law, notably in 
legal reforms enacted in 1935-36.27 In the field, British police continued with nasty, 
practical Ottoman traditions of policing, what they called ‘Turkish methods,’ 
brutality that was often outsourced to Arab police officers who spoke Arabic, knew 
the land and did the bulk of the day-to-day work, what policeman Jack Binsley 
called ‘real’ police work or the ‘interrogation methods’ that ‘smacked of the previous 
cruel Turkish system’.28 The British did nothing to stop these practices. Instead, they 
established as the legal standard official ordinances on collective punishment in the 
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early 1920s, backed up by draconian Emergency regulations in the 1930s. (The 
French had similar practices in North Africa, holding the nearest village to any 
incident against the forces responsible, and shooting ten Algerians if a French soldier 
was killed – what they called ‘collective responsibility.’29) British colonial authorities 
ruled by the official fiat of orders-in-council, an easy way to pass draconian 
legislation outside the UK where such things would be contested. In Palestine, these 
laws were the destructive official basis for policing, blending new codified group 
punishments based on cultural stereotypes of how to rule unruly Arabs with 
practical legacies of violence from the Ottoman era, easily adopted by men 
accustomed to such things. Such structures blended easily with the institutional 
memory of ‘Turkish’ policing held by Arab officers, now under overall British 
command. David Smiley, an Army officer on patrol with police in 1940, witnessed 
Arab policemen seize three suspects, beat the soles of their feet, apply lighted 
cigarettes to their testicles, and smash in their faces. When he remonstrated with the 
British policeman in charge at the ‘Gestapo’ methods being used, he was told 
 
….that force was the only language these Arabs understood. Under Turkish 
rule they had been brought up to respect such methods. ‘Where do you think 
we would get,’ he asked me ‘if we questioned them like a London bobby? I’ll 
tell you; the police methods would be laughed at, we should get no results, 
and our methods would be regarded as a sign of weakness.’ ‘In these 
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interrogations,’ he went on, ‘I make it a rule never to beat anyone up myself. I 
let Arab police beat up Arabs, and Jewish police beat up Jews.’30 
 
British police officers absorbed ‘Turkish ways,’ accepting them as the cultural norm 
in a colonial setting, and by using local police to torture local people the British 
exacerbated the embedded brutality of the Ottoman period, making it officially 
acceptable, but now set within a much better organized and more efficient British-
run colonial state. In prison, the British would get Jewish guards to beat Arab 
suspects and vice versa, spreading the idea of acceptable levels of official violence.31 
The British ‘ordered’ Arab policemen to carry out torture.32 Abu Gharbiyah 
remembered that a Jewish police officer ‘Sofer’ took part in torturing suspects, a 
point supported by the written record in which two Britons, Biggs and Robinson,33 
and a Jew, Sofer,34 were ‘principal offenders.’35 Robinson – of ‘Greek’ descent – once 
interrogated Abu Gharbiyah who also recalls a ‘notorious’ CID officer of (Christian) 
Lebanese origin, Muneer Abu Fadel, who later became a member of Lebanon’s 
parliament. The British outsourced the ‘frightfulness’ (to use a contemporary phrase) 
to foreigners – Jews, Greeks and Lebanese – making non-British people complicit in 
the management of the colonial state.36 
   
Racism 
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The racism that underpinned colonialism contributed both to normalising and 
casualizing violence by the police. Thus, policeman Douglas Duff, recalled the effects 
of a rifle-butt beating delivered by a colleague to an Arab in the 1920s: 
  
….our attitude was that of Britons of the Diamond Jubilee era, to us all non-
Europeans were ‘wogs,’ and Western non-Britons only slightly more worthy. 
When one of the Nablus detachment produced an old cigarette tin containing 
the brains of a man whose skull he had splintered with his rifle butt….I felt 
physically sick….the sight of that grog-blossomed face of the gendarme with 
his can half-full of human brains proudly brandishing his smashed rifle-butt 
as proof of his prowess, altered something inside of me; people who owned 
skins other than pink Western ones became human beings.37 
 
Duff put it simply when talking about a Muslim Palestinian crowd disturbance in 
1922: ‘Had our Arabic been better we might have sympathised with them; though I 
doubt it, for most of us were so infected by the sense of our own superiority over 
“lesser breeds” that we scarcely regarded these people as human.’38 Police officers in 
vehicles would try to knock down Arabs, ‘as running over an Arab is the same as a 
dog in England except we do not report it.’39  
 
Ineffectual and thuggish 
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It is not clear what came first: the officially tolerated thuggery that delegitimized the 
police, or the ineffectual police force that could only establish temporary forms of 
order through violence. The Palestine police depended on Arab and Jewish officers 
for day-to-day policing; it relied on the Jews or the armed forces for much of its 
intelligence gathering; in times of riot and rebellion it failed in its job, necessitating 
the deployment of the British Army.40 Reliant on locally recruited Arab officers for so 
much of what it did, the police suffered greatly in times of rebellion when these 
officers, in fear of their lives at the hands of rebels, deserted en masse. British police 
officers could (and did) rely on Jewish officers for local knowledge but both Jewish 
and Arab officers leaked intelligence to their respective communities and were never 
fully reliable.41 The Inspector-General of the Palestine police struggled to modernize 
the force in the 1930s, trying to establish proper police methods, to get educated 
recruits and obtain better intelligence through a reformed CID branch, the subject of 
recent studies.42 In the end, the Palestine police was neither an efficient police force 
nor an elite fighting force and, as the force struggled in its mission, it became 
frustrated and more brutal. 
 
In times of peace, the police functioned by getting the Arab and Jewish officers to do 
the policing, using whatever violence was necessary; in increasingly turbulent times, 
morale and discipline collapsed as, without support, British police officers could not 
keep order, and failure manifested itself in violence, drunkenness and looting.43 This 
meant that the Colonial Office called in the Army, further delegitimizing the police. 
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Hastily trained British police replacements rushed out to Palestine to replace lost 
Arab officers in times of revolt had no knowledge of local cultures or language.44 As 
stated earlier, the disorder was such that the Army feared that police behaviour 
would infect the soldiers: ‘Some of the police started running amok a bit in the 
bazaar and breaking things up in a most wanton manner. No doubt they have an 
awful lot of provocation for behaving like that but the whole proceeding was rather 
revolting and a very bad example to the troops.’45 The Army was unimpressed with 
it all and when it came to the help of the police in 1936 during a major Arab revolt, 
one Brigade commander remarked that the police did not know what they were, 
‘mock soldiers – neither soldiers nor policemen.’46 No better than ‘second class’ was 
how another Army Brigade commander described the police in a letter to his wife.47 
Fighting, looting, robbery, destruction, torture, and death squads became the order 
of the day, a far cry from their romantic image of a foreign legion (but, ironically, 
very much like the reality of life in the French Foreign Legion).48 This is not to say 
that all policemen were thugs – they were not – more that the ethos of their 
institution coupled to the practicalities of day-to-day policing resulted in extreme 
forms of coercion. Police violence towards women seems to have been limited, in 
some fashion.49 
 
Death squads: Manshiya and the Dajani hospital 
That the police would regularly shoot surrendered suspects caught in the field – men 
‘bumped off’ or ‘shot trying to escape’ – is not surprising in the context of colonial 
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rebellion.50 Similar things had happened in Ireland.51 The violence in Palestine that 
was meted out to civilians, old men, women and children who had nothing to do 
with rebel fighters seems more shocking, until one considers the collective 
punishment regime on which rested the colonial state and that normalised such 
things. British Assistant District Commissioner A. T. O. Lees (a former soldier) wrote 
of the police reaction to a raid by a rebel band on Hebron in 1938, after which the 
police punished the inhabitants: 
 
….the British police, no less valiant in ‘suppressing disorder’, had set fire to 
three shops, utterly gutting them, and had then looted three general goods 
stores, stealing some £300 worth of goods and altogether doing damage later 
assessed by a C.I.D. Committee of Enquiry (which would presumably not err 
on the side of extravagance) at £3,000.52 
 
The official phrase for such police operations was ‘restoring order,’ as Lees noted 
ironically.53 
 
To cover their tracks, police went in plain clothes – in ‘mufti’ – on operations, such as 
when a group raided the homes of poor Arab families in the Manshiya district on the 
border between Jaffa and Tel Aviv on 23-24 October 1938. (It is not apparent why the 
police targeted this poor neighbourhood.) This time, the police made the mistake of 
committing the outrage when a British official, Lees, was in the area. Officers beat up 
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local people, a two-year girl had her femur broken by a bullet as police opened fire 
on a woman trying to bar their entry (wounding the woman, too), houses were 
robbed, men cudgelled, windows broken, police broke chairs on people’s heads, 
they beat Arabs with pistol butts, police kicked men in the testicles so badly that the 
victims were hospitalised, police smashed up a local bakery and they assaulted the 
bakery staff. Lees 
 
….found the wrecked and blood-spattered rooms and the bullet holes, and I 
saw the less seriously injured victims. In one room I found an old man of 
evidently well over eighty years, lying on the floor on his blood-stained 
bedding, a blood-soaked bandage around his head, and his poor belongings 
lying in shreds and splinters around him.54 
 
The police also humiliated women in Manshiya, lining them up, questioning them in 
Arabic, ‘asking them their names and saying “How much to-day?” God knows what 
they meant. They then made indecent gestures with their revolvers and sticks.’55 
 
The tacit, implicit official backing for these operations was such that when Lees 
protested to the British Chief Magistrate, giving the name of one policeman 
involved, nothing happened. More seriously for Lees (and his career), furious local 
Arabs drew his attention to the scene of an assassination of an Arab suspect in the 
Manshiya neighbourhood on the morning of 24 October 1938, the day after Lees was 
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dealing with the attack on the Arabs of Manshiya. On the spot, recording the assault 
on the residents of Manshiya, Lees then left a detailed account in English of an even 
more shocking outrage. Lees collated the statements from seventeen witnesses who 
saw four uniformed British police stop their Dodge saloon car in the street and force 
out of the vehicle a handcuffed Arab, Mohammad Haddad, with them in the car, 
telling him to run. They tried this twice, Haddad obviously aware that once he was 
some distance from the officers they would shoot him. When he refused the second 
time, the police shot him as he stood close to the officers, with a rifle from two 
metres, after which the man faltered, a volley of shots then left the Arab writhing on 
the ground, at which point one of the officers, W. E. T. Wood, shot him with his 
pistol at close range. Haddad refused to die and still writhing he tried to raise 
himself on his elbow, ‘whereupon one of the other policemen stooped down and 
struck him a blow on the side of his head with his fist. After this the Arab lay still 
and the four Policemen started smoking cigarettes and laughing.’56 A police truck 
later came to the scene and picked up the body, after which an official report stated 
that the dead man had been shot ‘while attempting to escape.’57 A policeman later 
the same day stopped at the local garage of Amin Andrawus (also spelt Andraus) – a 
local man who had witnessed the outrage – and spoke to the garage clerk about 
what had happened:  
 
‘Know all about that. The man was a gangster, and had to be killed’, or words 
to that effect. The clerk remonstrated, saying that if he was a gangster he 
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should be properly tried and convicted, to which the constable replied, ‘No, 
it’s better to kill him like this’, or words to that effect.58 
 
Andrawus, the garage owner, fled to Beirut, fearful of being killed by the police as a 
material witness. His family and friends had urged him not to appear as a witness, 
‘as it might cost him his life.’59 In a plea to the Palestine High Commissioner, 
Andrawus wrote: ‘I make this report in great fear of my own life and that of my wife 
and family. Murder by the police is not uncommon there are so many means 
available to them to carry it out. I ask Your Excellency’s personal security for myself 
and my family be protected against police vengeance.’60 
 
Lees, meanwhile, made an official report, which helped to prompt a trial of the four 
policemen in December 1938, the only recorded case – to this author’s knowledge – 
of official sanction against the police for such things during the Arab revolt in 
Palestine, 1936-39. The policemen involved – T. Mansell, P. Crossley, W. E. T. Wood 
and T. Crossley – received sentences in January 1939 ranging from being bound over 
(the two Crossleys) to one year in jail (Mansell) to three years for Wood (for 
manslaughter), Mansell’s sentence being reduced on appeal.61 Woods delete the ‘s’ – 
it’s Wood not Woods had had ‘the comparative decency to administer the “coup de 
grace” to the poor wretch whose bowels were protruding from wounds in the back’ 
and he paid the judicial price as it was his pistol that delivered the final shot, leaving 
him accused of the most serious charge.62 The colonial Government had neutered the 
17 
 
Palestine judiciary following a ruling that had gone against the Government in 1936 
by the British Chief Justice in Palestine, Sir Michael McDonnell, after which 
McDonnell was dismissed. By 1938, the judiciary knew its place and returned 
(without a jury, as was the case in Palestine) the astonishing verdict of ‘attempted 
manslaughter’ on Wood. The Colonial Secretary made the most of this verdict, 
pointing out to Parliament in London that such allegations were unfounded but if 
found the Government would not hesitate to prosecute offenders.63 
 
The High Commissioner sent Lees home to the UK, a tale told in detail by an angry 
Lees in his private papers, after which police officers broke into Lees’ home in Jaffa – 
OGPU methods, as a friend of Lees pointed out.64 (Nor did Lees’ luck improve: he 
was interned during the Second World War for his alleged connections to the British 
Union of Fascists.) English friends had told Lees before he left Palestine not to sit by 
un-curtained windows or be out of doors after dark lest he ‘stop’ a ‘stray bullet’ from 
the offended police.65 Being white and British did not grant one protection from 
police depredations, as being white and French did not save Henri Alleg from being 
tortured in Algeria in the 1950s by a Foreign Legion ‘specialist.’66 S. O. Richardson of 
Jaffa, a British lawyer and local representative of the Federation of British Industries, 
wrote to the High Commissioner regarding the Manshiya assassination, concluding 
how if the High Commissioner were to take any action, ‘I ask that you will if 
possible suppress my name. Even an Englishman of some prominence is in no small 
danger in these days if he offends the police’.67 That said, it might be that British 
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police considered killing a British resident in Palestine but it seems highly unlikely 
that they would have tortured him. This author has found no evidence of police 
killing any British resident in Palestine.  
 
Determining the details surrounding the murky business of police assassinations is 
problematic, the contemporary record shedding some partial light. Recent empirical 
and theoretical work by scholars such as David Cesarani and David French is useful 
in this regard.68 Partial names of those responsible emerge from the archives. Writing 
to Lees, Richardson noted how ‘man who is really responsible for these murders was 
of course Collinge who has now joined the murdered….The victim is the son of the 
litigant Ibrahim Abu Kuheil whom you know, a youth of 21. As far as I can ascertain 
he was shot merely in mistake for an alleged terrorist’.69 This refers to a botched 
assassination at a hospital by police of an alleged terrorist in which the assassins 
who had been ‘ordered to bump off’ the suspect shot the wrong man, ‘the first 
wounded man they could find, in the hope of clicking for the King’s Police Medal 
which usually follows these episodes in Palestine.’70 
 
The incident that Richardson was referring to seems to have been one at the Dajani 
hospital in Jaffa where, on 15 June 1939, a party of police some in uniform and some 
in mufti appeared, some of them climbing over the wall, while others knocked at the 
door. When let in by the doorman, a group of four policemen went to a ward in 
which was one was one Ibrahim obn [or ibn] Khail [sic – presumably the son of the 
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person as mentioned above], suffering from a bullet wound in the shoulder inflicted 
by police four days earlier. ‘As the light was switched on, the man wakened from 
sleep and finding himself covered by revolvers sat up in bed with a scream. The 
police fired one shot through his head, blowing out his brains, and retired whence 
they came’. One policeman then remarked: 
 
‘….we have carried out our orders.’ Later a police officer arrived, ostensibly to 
take statements. He explained that the victim had tried to escape through the 
window….It should be noted that, ‘Shot while trying to escape,’ or, ‘Shot 
while breaking the cordon’ is a daily announcement in this country. Most, or 
many, of these incidents are ‘bumpings-off’ – nothing more or less.71 
 
According to Lees, the target for the police was a man who was one of the principal 
witnesses against a British police Sergeant and a Jewish Advocate who were to be 
tried for conspiracy and the taking and giving of bribes to facilitate illegal Jewish 
immigration.72 Police violence was not just about political assassinations; criminality 
by officers played its part and low-level theft from civilians by police was an 
endemic problem in Palestine.73 
 
The events at Manshiya and the Dajani hospital establish that there were police 
death squads, a ‘dirty war’ in Palestine, euphemistically called ‘special squads.’  
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When back in London, Lees met a former constable of the Palestine police who told 
him that the man shot in Manshiya had first been tortured and then taken out to be 
killed: 
   
….he had actually heard the British C.I.D. Sergeant concerned give the order 
to his ‘Special Squad’ to take the prisoner out and shoot him (‘Take him for a 
ride’ were the actual words), after repeated floggings had failed to elicit from 
him whatever information it was the Sergeant desired.74 
 
Lees was told by friends not to return to Palestine as his life was under threat, advice 
that he heeded.75 This was not new, such things being called ‘assassination direction’ 
in Ireland, after which the ‘hidden hand’ protected those involved in breaking the 
law.76 In Galilee in 1938, a British Army officer, Orde Wingate, established Army-run 
‘Special Night Squads,’ responsible for gross abuses against local Palestinians.77 
Evidently, both the police and the Army liked to be ‘special.’ Hugh Foot (later Lord 
Caradon), a senior colonial official at the time in Palestine, saw first-hand the impact 
that soldiers such as Wingate had as he ‘wiped out opposition gangs by killing them 
all. He was taking sides. It was a dirty war of assassination and counter-
assassination. I don’t think we should have got mixed up in that.’78 
 
Commands relating to the sorts of abuses discussed here were ‘usually conveyed 
verbally and in a coded language.’79 In Algeria, those killed by the forces of law and 
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order had been ‘neutralized.’80 When the French Army wanted to kill trouble makers 
the suspects were ‘let loose in the countryside.’81 In South Africa under Apartheid, 
orders to state-sanctioned death squads were always given verbally.82 This 
complicates the task of the historian. While there is one candid memoir of the reality 
of policing in Palestine by a British Constable83 that can be set alongside a similarly 
revealing set of private papers, again from a junior officer involved,84 history sheds a 
dim light on events, the battle in Palestine, as with the one in Algeria later on, 
literally and figuratively, ‘s’est déroulée la nuit.’85 The stories of the (often illiterate) 
peasants who bore the violent brunt of this hidden history are rarely told, except by 
way of deep mining of Western archival sources. There is some Arabic-language 
material from Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, Khalil al-Sakakini and Akram Zu‘aytir dealing 
with abuses,86 alongside local protests passed by way of the Anglican clergy in 
Palestine stored in a UK archive,87 but not much, reflective perhaps of the 
uninterested disdain of Palestinian elites towards their own poor. Ted Swedenburg’s 
published English-language oral history project on the Mandate years is 
remarkable.88 As one war veteran remarked, he and his comrades did ‘not want to 
remember the bad stuff,’ a sentiment applicable not just to perpetrators but also to 
victims, one imagines, and one reason it is so hard to uncover the truth of some 
histories.89 
  
Torture centres 
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Torture sat atop the systemic structures detailed above. Arabs knew what awaited 
them if arrested and they threatened suicide if ever detained by certain, named 
police officers.90 The Palestine police ran the country’s prisons and the police by 1938 
had established dedicated torture centres, very much like the one at el-Biar near 
Algiers where Henri Alleg was tortured in 1957 by French paratroopers and 
legionnaires.91 As well as the main police headquarters at the Russian compound in 
west Jerusalem, police CID had a separate, secret house at the Talavera military 
camp at the Allenby barracks in south Jerusalem, now covered by residential 
housing; another torture site was in Acre Citadel prison.92 Arab suspects were ‘lifted’ 
from their homes and executed; others found themselves the subject of torture ‘in 
methods we would hear about in the Middle Ages.’ 93 In addition to regular beatings 
in which guards knocked out suspects’ teeth and which could leave victims ‘almost 
unrecognizable,’94 police officers carried out a variety of tortures, detailed in full 
elsewhere.95 
 
Arab detainees in Palestine’s prisons protested in petitions made through the 
Christian (British) Anglican mission at the extreme treatment meted out by guards. 
Prisoners jumped to their deaths from high windows to escape their captors, had 
their testicles tied with cord, were tortured with strips of wood with nails in, had 
wire tightened around their big toes, hair was torn from their faces and heads, 
special instruments were used to pull out fingernails, red hot skewers were used on 
detainees, prisoners were sodomized, boiling oil was used on prisoners as were 
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intoxicants (morphine, cocaine and heroin), there were electric shocks, water was 
funnelled into suspects’ stomachs and there were mock executions.96 As Frances 
Newton, a pro-Arab British resident in Haifa noted, ‘the police asked permission to 
use torture to the prisoners to extract information and that permission was granted 
from the Colonial Office. Several of the leading police officers in Jerusalem refused 
to countenance it. One of them has since left the country.’97 Newton’s complaints led 
to an official order banning her from Palestine. Euphemisms were again deployed to 
mask what was really going on, the torture facilities being referred to as ‘Arab 
Investigation Centres’;98 in Kenya in the 1950s, such places were called ‘Mau Mau 
Investigation Centres.’99 
 
Afterword – the Palestine police and imperial history 
There are different ways of telling the story of law and order in Palestine after the 
Great War. Traditional histories present a romantic tale of adventure or they argue 
that the problem with the Palestine police was inadequate training, the poor quality 
of recruits and the lack of good intelligence, all of which made the force less than 
effective.100 Certainly, there was adventure to be had for young British men in 
Palestine; there were also serious systemic deficiencies in the system of formalized 
violence as embodied in the police, ones that came to the fore every time there was 
widespread rebellion, as there was in 1929, 1936 and 1945, when the colonial 
authorities had to call in the Army. The police was unable to rely on popular consent 
to do its job and it was reliant on the Army in times of major disturbances. This 
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weakness manifested itself in systematic informal, grass-roots based coercion, 
violence that got worse as the police grip on power weakened, as it did in 1938-39, at 
the height of the Arab revolt. The question is how to place this violence within the 
wider span of imperial history. 
 
When the British departed Palestine in 1948, they left a legacy of legally enshrined 
collective punishment (fines, house destruction, seizure of goods etc.) and violence 
(assault, torture, detention) towards Arabs, and tacitly accepted abuse by agents of 
the State, embodied in the Mandate legal system and the police force. The British 
had the idea that Palestinian village life revolved around a collective ‘social system 
based on mutual protection rather than justice,’101 a view in some measure endorsed 
by the rural collective faz‘a (alarm),102 and they established unjust collective 
punishment as the norm for an amorphous Oriental mass of peasants unused to 
justice. This punitive regime also applied in theory to Jews but the British in practice 
never collectively or individually punished the Jews in the way that they did the 
Arabs, the Jewish community successfully negotiating or resisting colonial rule, as 
needs be. Moreover, the Palestine police had employed many thousands of ‘Loyalist’ 
Jews as temporary,103 full- or part-time104 police officers, there to enforce the law in 
peaceful periods and in times of revolt they were there to assist the British to 
suppress the Palestinians; meanwhile, the British Army trained and equipped Jewish 
soldiers in the late 1930s and 1940s, a policy with ‘blowback’ when the Jews 
successfully fought the British in Palestine after 1945. 
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The Jews who had served under the British set up the Israeli state apparatus in 1948. 
Their attitudes mirrored those of the British before them, under whom they had 
served, made worse by Jewish settlement and State-building, a project that required 
the removal or subjugation of recalcitrant local Arabs. As a Jewish doctor in Mandate 
Palestine told a British Army officer serving out in the country, the ‘Turks’ had not 
only been much tougher and much better at controlling the Arabs but also that ‘the 
Arabs understood the lash and expected the lash. And the harder you treat them the 
better they will behave’.105 The doctor added, ‘And there’s no doubt that the British 
have never I think really been harsh.’106 The new regime of Jewish order in the 
country was to be even tougher – certainly more efficient in what it did – and run by 
people with an intimate knowledge and understandable dislike of the local non-
Jewish population who blocked the path to the creation of a Jewish State. Familiarity 
bred contempt, as it did for the police; the Army’s temporary rotations through 
Palestine by regiments softened any hostility: ‘I think we British rather admire the 
Arabs,’ was one Army officer’s far from isolated comment.107 As colonists, the 
Israelis after 1948 adopted British imperial policies in their dealings with the Arabs – 
the British were, after all, experts in such things – instituting collective punishments 
and abusing the local Arabs, often in the same torture centres established under the 
Mandate Government.108 
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The French handed on a similar collective, colonial memory of what to do to the 
Belgians in the Congo and, more significantly, to the Americans, planning for the 
war in Vietnam in the early 1960s. French Army officers from Algeria – men who 
had served with the elite shock troops of the Legion and the paratroopers – such as 
Paul Aussaresses, Roger Faulques and Roger Trinquier instructed the Americans on 
insurgent warfare and they travelled to places such as Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to 
teach the US Army the rules of counter-insurgency.109 Similarly, the Palestine police 
did more than just pass on ways of doing things to the Israeli State. When the force 
was disbanded in 1948, the men were given the option of staying in the Service and 
many went to Malaya, just as the Emergency there began against Communist 
guerrillas, after which there were insurgencies to fight in Kenya, Cyprus, Aden and 
Northern Ireland, right up to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Men who had 
been in the ‘Black and Tans’ were still serving as policemen and officials in Britain’s 
colonies in the 1950s. The continuity from policing in Ireland in the 1920s, to 
Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s, and then to the post-war British Empire meant the 
transfer of an institutional memory from one setting, such as Palestine, to the next, a 
fascinating subject but one that is beyond the remit of this essay and is discussed in 
part elsewhere.110 
 
The Palestine police was never as famous as its French counterpart. It never covered 
itself in glory in the way that the French Foreign Legion did on the field of battle. But 
it had a similar task. Both institutions were served by former soldiers – who brought 
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with them the traumas of previous wars – and they extended the shelf-life of empire, 
maintaining colonial order until the weakness of European power after 1945 
conspired with powerful, well-organised emerging nationalist struggles to defeat 
them, the French Foreign Legion shrinking in size and retiring after the debacle in 
Algeria to a new base and a new life in Aubagne near Marseilles, the Palestine police 
to an old comrades’ association run from a house in north London with its archive of 
papers stored at an Oxford college. The French Foreign Legion survived the collapse 
of empire and still embodies martial, manly values; the Palestine police is now 
kitsch. 
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